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   Beside various differences between Japan and other modern democracies, there are 
similarities. The mass media play various roles in public policy processes', as do statutory 
and non- statutory public advisory bodies (ABs). Similarly, in Japan as in other modern 
democracies two questions have become subject to polemics and discourses: (1) whether by 
participating the media actually influence public policy making or rather are being managed by 
government.2 and (2) whether ABs autonomous of government control or manipulation, and 
effective in achieving their formal goals. 
   What Japan, on one hand, and other democracies, on the other, do not have in common is 
the extent to which the media pay attention to and its members participate in ABs. My 
research reveals that typical of Japan and rare or nonexistent in other democracies is very 
high salience of ABs in the mass media and of the mass media in ABs. Almost every day, the 
Japanese major newspapers and electronic media cover and evaluate the formation, activities, 
or reports and recommedations of at least one advisory body. Japanese media by far surpass 
their foreign counterparts in frequency and thoroughness of their coverage of ABs.3 Most 
importantly, Japanese media not only cover and evaluate, but also participate in ABs as 
members, both when the media are the policy object (i.e. the subject of deliberation directly 
concerns some aspect of the media) and otherwise. In other democracies they cover and 
evaluate, but rarely participate4 the occasional exception being mainly when the media are 
the policy object.5 
   Japanese journalists' participation in public-policy deliberation groups is neither a new, 
postwar phenomenon, nor restricted to ABs formed by government. Since prewar days, 
eminent journalists have participated in ABs formed by government, as well as in various 
kinds of policy study and deliberation groups formed by organizations outside of government; 
the latter included policy study and deliberation groups formed by media organizations or by 
their members. The members of some of the study and deliberation groups formed outside of 
government have included state bureaucrats.6 A recent famous example of a non-governmental 
public policy deliberation councils is the Seiji Kaikaku Suishin Kyogikai (Committee for the 
Promotion of Political Reforms tiaz5C I -Mil ), formed in 1992 by business, labor, and 
media leaders.? 
   In the postwar era, two types of public advisory bodies have evolved: statutory (known as
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shingikai k) and non-statutory (often, and misleadingly, referred to as shiteki shimon kikan 
fl, a-MMA , i.e. "private" advisory bodies). Both are public in two respects: they are formed 
by government authorities and include members currently not in government. In recent years, 
the two types of ABs have become increasingly similar in membership and functions.8 My 
analysis below is focused on shingikai, the more formal type and about which fuller 
information is available. The analysis of membership is largely based on data on shingikai in 
1973, 1983, and 1992 I generated from Japanese government publications and various Who's 
Whos.9 
   About 50% of all shingikai have included at least one member from the mass media 
(hereafter referred to as "journalists"). But journalists have constituted a small minority of the 
members of the respective shingikai. Journalists' membership in shingikai has been dominated 
by NHK (the semi- governmental broadcasting corporation) and the "big five" national 
newspapers (Nikkei, Yomiuri, Asahi, Mainichi, and Sankei, in decreasing order of frequency). 
   Journalists' participation in shingikai has become institutionalized and "patterned."10 
There has been notable continuity of individual journalists from one term (ordinarily three 
years) to another; and non- continuing individual journalists have almost invariably been 
replaced by other journalists, often from the same media organization. And certain bureaus 
(the administrative level that actually determines membership composition) tend to 
continuously appoint journalists from one media organization, or from a limited number of 
media organizations. 
   Shingikai media members play several roles. Like university professors, media members 
are typically appointed as "members of learning and experience" (gakushiki keikensha *14 
  ) and/or "representatives of the `public interest"' (Koeki /a ). In 1992, all media shingikai 
but three also had university professors among their members. They are expected to 
contribute certain expertise and/ or take fair, impartial positions. And as in the case of 
university professors, media members have been variously criticized for lacking assertiveness, 
being ignored by government (including, at times, the organizations which appointed them) 
and by other categories of members, or for having been manipulated into the roles of 
legitimizers and publicizers of the appointing authorities' agenda and policy positions." 
   My analysis of media members' roles is based on three types of evidence: (a) responses of 
media members to a questionnaire I mailed in 1974 to members of all categories other than 
cabinet members and state bureaucrats,12 (b) summaries of surveys of media members' 
evaluation of their participation in shingikai and kondankai conducted by and for the Asahi, and 
(c) a typology of shingikai constructed by Sone and his associates at Keio University13. There 
types of evidence are supplemented by sporadic interviews with several Japanese journalists. 
   With few exceptions, journalists do not tend to contribute expertise in the narrow sense 
of the term or state-of-the-art scientific knowledge, but rather a general grasp of a given policy 
area, and familiarity with the interests, resources, values, views and policy positions of 
various of groups and organizations of government and civil society in that policy area. 
Individual media members currently affiliated with a media organization are "boundary
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transaction persons" playing a "two- level game" - one vis- a- vis their "lifetime" media 
organization, the other vis-a-vis the appointing authority and other members of the respective 
advisory body. Affiliated media ordinarily behave as free agents, but when their organization 
has formulated a position which is incongruent with theirs, they tend to defer to the position 
of their organization. When the issue entrusted to or taken up by a shingikai is highly 
conflictual and their media organization has been strongly concerned but internally divided 
failed to forge a unified position, the media member will abstain, resign, or refrain from 
accepting appointment in the first place. 
   This can be explained by the affiliated journalists' work environment. Like employees in 
high positions in other large scale Japanese organizations, their training, placement in certain 
departments of the organization (or subsequently in subsidiaries of the organization), 
promotion patterns, and the emphasis on group activity (what, in the case of journalists, 
Haruhara and Amenomori refer to as "corporate journalisn") 14 - all combine in forging a 
strong organizational orientation. At the same time, another aspect of their environment pulls 
them in a different direction. Like other members of shingikai and kondankai, they tend in the 
course of continuous participation to assume the role of "boundary transaction persons":15 
though committed to their organization, and under the circumstances mentioned above under 
obligation to act as their organization's instructed delegates, interaction with other shingikai 
members becomes a learning process, often leading to consensus among shingikai members, at 
which point they, media members included, attempt to convince their organization to go along 
with that consensus. 
   Analysis of the types of shngikai whose members include journalists suggests that they 
often play the role of legitimizers of the authority's policy proposals, contrary to the image 
the appointing authority seeks to project. But, as in the case of expertise, legitimizing should 
be put in proper context: the policy proposals media members appear to legitimize often are 
products of complex pre-shingikai consultations in which journalists participate. 
   In Kumon's terminology, Japan has become a network society and shingikai the most 
representative from of Japanese "transworld network organizations." Transworld: they consist 
largely of representatives of a variety, though not all, Japanese "worlds" or "circles" (kai) 
business, political, bureaucratic, educational, mass media (genronkai ), increasingly labor. 
Organizations: they have patterned membership and complex structures. Networks: their 
members largely seek to share information; their structure is not hierarchical; and being 
consensus oriented they ideally make decisions on a "unit-veto" basis respecting minorities, 
but to avoid paralysis and be effective, apply the principle of "wa" (harmony), often through 
mediators, in an attempt to persuade minorities, sometimes even majorities, to yield or 
compromise in the "public interest."16 The extent and pattern of mass media participation in 
shingikai indicate that the major media organizations have become a salient component of 
patterned public policy networks (in addition to academics and the "triangle" of interest group 
organizations, interested Diet members [zoku giin A , ], and bureaucrats of certain 
administrative units.) More generally, the Japanese media "world" (, p a A) itself is a well 
                                        1-147
integrated network via horizontal, cross-organization communication and cooperation channels 
at various levels, with economic resources and interests, on one hand, and public- oriented 
values and policy-relevant resources, on the other. It has become one of the major hubs of 
very complex public policy processes, of which shingikai are only one, relatively visible 
forum.
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